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Can a cake be divided amongst people in such a manner that each individual is
content with their share? In a game, is there a combination of strategies where
no player is motivated to change their approach? Is there a price where the
demand for goods is entirely met by the supply in the economy and there is no
tendency for anything to change? In this paper, we will prove the existence of
envy-free cake divisions, equilibrium game strategies and equilibrium prices in
the economy, as well as discuss what brings them together under one heading.
This paper examines three important results in mathematics: Sperner’s lemma,
the Brouwer fixed point theorem and the Kakutani fixed point theorem, as well
as the interconnection between these theorems. Fixed point theorems are central
results of topology that discuss existence of points in the domain of a continuous
function that are mapped under the function to itself or to a set containing the
point. The Kakutani fixed point theorem can be thought of as a generalization of
the Brouwer fixed point theorem. Sperner’s lemma, on the other hand, is often
described as a combinatorial analog of the Brouwer fixed point theorem, if the
assumptions of the lemma are developed as a function. In this thesis, we first
introduce Sperner’s lemma and it serves as a building block for the proof of the
fixed point theorem which in turn is used to prove the Kakutani fixed point
theorem that is at the top of the pyramid.
This paper highlights the interdependence of the results and how they all are
applicable to prove the existence of equilibria in fair division problems, game
theory and exchange economies. Equilibrium means a state of rest, a point
where opposing forces balance. Sperner’s lemma is applied to the cake cutting
dilemma to find a division where no individual vies for another person’s share,
the Brouwer fixed point theorem is used to prove the existence of an equilibrium
game strategy where no player is motivated to change their approach, and the
Kakutani fixed point theorem proves that there exists a price where the demand
for goods is completely met by the supply and there is no tendency for prices to
change within the market.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In this paper, we introduce and prove three important results in mathematics,
namely Sperner’s lemma, the Brouwer fixed point theorem and the Kakutani
fixed point theorem. In addition, we present applications of these results in the
social sciences.
These three results are interdependent and the topics are developed in a manner
that the combinatorial result, Sperner’s lemma, is introduced first and it serves
as the main tool in the proof of the Brouwer fixed point theorem, which in turn is
the basis for the proof of the Kakutani fixed point theorem. This interconnection
runs deeper than merely an aid in proving the theorems. Sperner’s lemma can
be thought of as a combinatorial analog to the Brouwer fixed point theorem, and
the Kakutani fixed point theorem can be seen as an extension of the Brouwer
fixed point theorem from point-valued functions to set-valued functions.
In a way, all three results allow us to prove the existence of a fixed point for
continuous functions, that is, a point that maps to itself under that function. In
the case of Sperner’s lemma, we do not work with an explicit function. Instead,
Sperner defined a labeling on simplices and Sperner’s lemma accounts for the
existence of at least one "point" in the set (a sub-simplex in the simplex) with the
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same labeling as the whole set (simplex). We discuss the concepts of simplex
and sub-simplex in the next section.
Another reason we chose to present these three results is that they all can be
applied to model human behavior and choices. In this paper, we look at their
application to the fields of economics and game theory. Economics is the study
of problems of choice, that is, how to allocate scarce goods and resources so as to
maximize welfare, growth or other objectives. Game theory, on the other hand,
though often considered a branch of economics, focuses more on strategies and
outcomes. However, both economics and game theory study human behavior,
and one of the main ideas studied in these fields is that of equilibrium, a state of
rest where counteracting forces balance. We find that fixed point theorems have
interesting applications in determining the equilibria and distributions in social
sciences.
We use Sperner’s lemma to prove the existence of an envy-free division in a
distribution of goods. Fair-division problems have long been discussed in
economics, and using this lemma, we can guarantee that a division exists where
each person is content with her/his share and no one has a tendency to envy
another person for their share. This idea can be equated to that of a Nash
equilibrium in game theory, where each participant is content with the strategy
they choose and has no motivation to change it, given the strategies of the other
participants of the game. We use the Brouwer fixed point theorem to prove the
existence of such an equilibrium in non-cooperative games and look at example
games. Finally, we use the Kakutani fixed point theorem to prove the existence
of an equilibrium in an economic system where m consumers are endowed
with a fixed supply of n goods that they can exchange amongst themselves. It is
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not obvious that equilibrium exists in such an exchange economy; however, the
theorem allows us to prove that values can be structured in a manner that each
player’s demand can be met, given the supply.
In the next chapter, we state and prove Sperner’s lemma in one, two and n
dimensions and look at its application in a fair-division problem, addressing the
envy-free division of a cake. In the following chapter, we state and prove the
Brouwer fixed point theorem in one, two and n dimensions using Sperner’s
lemma for the latter two cases. Furthermore, we apply the Brouwer fixed point
theorem to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in game theory. In the last
chapter, we state and prove the Kakutani fixed point theorem in one and n
dimensions, followed by a discussion of its application to prove that an
equilibrium exists in an exchange economy.
There are many, essentially equivalent for each, versions of Sperner’s lemma, the
Brouwer fixed point theorem, and the Kakutani fixed point theorem in the
mathematics literature. The versions we present are adapted for the setting as
we develop it here.
Before we delve into the theorems and their applications, we need to familiarize
ourselves with some definitions and theorems that will form the background for
the work presented in subsequent chapters. We assume that the reader is
familiar with introductory topology, analysis and linear algebra. In this section,
we introduce and state the basic concepts and results that we use in the main
part of this paper.
3
1.1 Background
Much of the work we do in this paper involves simplices in Euclidean space. It
will be helpful to look at some definitions that will be of use to us and that will
make the concepts clearer.
Definition. An n - simplex S is the convex hull in Rm, with m ≥ n+ 1, of
n+ 1 geometrically independent points v0, v1, ...., vn. We call v0, v1, ...., vn the
vertices of the simplex S.
Note that the points v0, v1, ...., vn ∈ Rm are geometrically independent if the
vectors −−→v0v1, −−→v0v2, ..., −−→v0vn are linearly independent. So a 1 - simplex is a line
segment in R2, a 2 - simplex is a triangle in R3, a 3 - simplex is a tetrahedron
in R4, and so on.
Definition. The standard n - simplex σn in Rn+1 is the convex hull of the points
(1, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1, ..., 0), ..., (0, 0, ..., 1). The points (1, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1, ..., 0), ...,
(0, 0, ..., 1) are the vertices of σn.
Note that if x = (x0, x1, ..., xn) ∈ σn, then 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i and
n∑
i=0
xi = 1. More generally, if S is an n - simplex with vertices v0, v1, ...., vn
and x ∈ S, then we can express x uniquely as
x = α0v0 + α1v1 + ... + αnvn
for αi ∈ R such that αi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} and
n∑
i=0
αi = 1.
Definition. Let S be an n - simplex with vertices v0, v1, ...., vn. Let f be a function
defined on {v0, v1, ...., vn} such that f(vi) = wi ∈ Rm. Then the linear
extension of f is the function f : S → Rm defined so that if x =
n∑
i=0
αivi,
then f(x) =
n∑
i=0
αiwi.
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Throughout the paper, we will be working with subdivisions of simplices.
Before we define what is meant by subdivision of an n - simplex, let us
understand the terms face and facet of an n - simplex.
Definition. An m - face of an n - simplex S is the m - simplex formed by m + 1
vertices out of the n + 1 vertices of S.
Definition. An (n− 1) - face of an n - simplex is called a facet. In other words, a facet
is an (n−1) - simplex formed by n vertices out of the n + 1 vertices of an n - simplex.
By giving a specific name to the (n− 1) - faces of an n - simplex, we are
distinguishing them from the other faces in our discussion. We can see that an
n - simplex has n + 1 distinct facets. For instance, the two facets of a 1 -
simplex are the two end points of the line segment. The three facets of a 2 -
simplex are the three sides of the triangle. The four facets of a 3 - simplex are the
four triangular faces of a tetrahedron and so on.
Definition. A subdivision of an n - simplex S (Figure 1.1) is a collection of subsets
of S, each an n - simplex, called a sub-simplex of S, such that:
1. The union of all the sub-simplices is S.
2. Any two sub-simplices either do not intersect or have an intersection that is a
common face.
Figure 1.1. An example of a subdivision of a 2 - simplex S
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A subdivision of a 2 − simplex is called a triangulation. Note that in Figure 1.1,
if we subdivide each small triangle in a manner similar to how S is subdivided,
we obtain another subdivision of S with triangles whose diameter is 1
6
of
those in the initial subdivision. In this manner, we can construct sequences of
subdivisions whose sub-simplex diameters go to zero in the limit. Such
sequences will be of benefit to us in limiting arguments we make in the paper.
Another important notion we work with is continuity. In topological spaces, we
say that a function f is continuous if pre-images of open sets under f are open.
For functions mapping between Euclidean spaces, there are various equivalent
definitions, including the traditional  − δ definition. We use the definition of
continuity of functions that is as follows.
Definition. If D ⊂ Rn and f : D → Rm , then f is continuous if for every
sequence (xj) in D converging to x ∈ D, the sequence (f(xj)) converges to f(x).
So far, we have been talking about point-valued functions. However, both in the
application of Sperner’s lemma and for the Kakutani fixed point theorem, we
work with set-valued functions. Let us first understand what is meant by a
set-valued function and then define continuity for such functions.
Definition. Given sets X and Y, a set-valued function is a function
f : X → P(Y ) where P(Y ) is the power set of Y. Thus, for each x ∈ X, its image
f(x) is a subset of Y .
Continuity for set-valued functions is a natural extension of the definition of
continuity for point-valued functions.
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Definition. Assume X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ Rn. A function f : X → P(Y ) is
continuous if for every pair of convergent sequences xn → x in X and yn → y in
Y such that yn ∈ f(xn) for all n, it follows that y ∈ f(x).
1.2 Important Results
The following results are straightforward convergence results that will be of use
to us. We also state and prove a lemma that will be useful to us in the proof of
the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem.
Theorem 1.1. If D ⊂ Rn is closed and bounded, and (xn) is a sequence in D, then (xn)
has a convergent subsequence.
Theorem 1.2. Let (xn) and (yn) be sequences in Rn. If (xn) → x, and
| xn − yn | → 0, then (yn) → x.
Theorem 1.3. If f : D → R is continuous, (xj) → x in D, (aj) → a in R
and f(xj) ≤ aj for all j, then f(x) ≤ a.
Lemma 1.1. Let σn be the standard n - simplex in Rn+1 and let x, y be points in
σn. If xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, then x = y.
Proof. Let σn be the standard n - simplex in Rn+1. Let x = (x0, x1, ..., xn) and
y = (y0, y1, ..., yn) be points in σn such that xi ≤ yi for all i. Suppose x 6= y.
Then there exists at least one j ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} such that xj 6= yj. This means
xj < yj.
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However since x, y ∈ σn,
n∑
i=0
xi =
n∑
i=0
yi = 1.
This means that there exists k ∈ {0, 1, ...., n} such that xk > yk. This is a
contradiction since xi ≤ yi for all i. Thus, there is no j ∈ {0, 1, ...., n} such
that xj 6= yj. Therefore, x = y.
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CHAPTER 2
SPERNER’S LEMMA AND FAIR DIVISION
Emanuel Sperner (1905 - 1980) was a German mathematician who received
much recognition for his contribution to topology, analytic geometry, algebra
and matrix theory. He is best known for two results, namely Sperner’s theorem
and Sperner’s lemma, that he developed at an early age of 22 years. He was
awarded a doctorate with distinction for his thesis titled Neuer Beweis für die
Invarianz der Dimensionszahl und des Gebietes in 1928. Sperner’s lemma was
written as a part of his thesis, and later he used it to give a simple proof of the
Lebesgue covering theorem and the invariance of dimension and domain
theorems. This lemma gained popularity among topologists, and B. Knaster, C
Kuratowski, and S Mazurkiewicz used it to prove the Brouwer fixed point theorem
[1]. Later applications of the Sperner’s lemma came up in fair division problems,
including a recent one by Francis Edward Su [2] who used it to calculate
envy-free rent division.
2.1 Sperner’s Lemma
In this chapter, we focus on Sperner’s lemma and its applications to fair-division
problems. In the next chapter, we use it to prove theorems that help us
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understand the topological connections to economics and game theory. The idea
outlined by the lemma is very intuitive, especially in dimensions one and two. In
higher dimensions, it is more difficult to visualize, however the idea is exactly
the same, as we shall see. We discuss the one-dimensional and two-dimensional
cases next and then separately provide proofs of the one-dimensional,
two-dimensional and n - dimensional cases.
The one-dimensional case is as follows. If we write down 0’s and 1’s in a single
line with at least one of each, it is obvious that at least once a 0 is written next to
a 1. Moreover, if we start and end with the same number, clearly the number of
times a 0 comes next to a 1 is even since we switch between 0 and 1 an even
number of times to make sure we end with the number that we started with.
Similarly, if we start with a 0 and end with a 1 (or vice-versa), the number of
times a 0 comes next to a 1 is odd.
We can extend this idea to two dimensions using a main triangle T that has
vertices distinctly labeled 0, 1, and 2. Suppose we have a triangulation of T
and we were to label the sub-triangle vertices with the numbers 0, 1, or 2
following the single rule that sub-triangle vertices on a side of the main triangle
T are not labeled with the number on the main triangle vertex opposite to that
side. Then we find that no matter how we label the sub-triangles, we end up
with at least one sub-triangle with all its vertices distinctly labeled 0, 1, and 2.
In fact, we always end up with an odd number of such triangles. Two examples
of this idea can be seen in the Figure 2.1, where sub-triangles labeled with 0, 1,
and 2 are highlighted.
10
Figure 2.1. A look at the two-dimensional Sperner’s Lemma
It might be interesting to take it up as an exercise to try to find some labeling that
does not give an odd number of sub-triangles with vertices distinctly labeled
0, 1, and 2. You will find that it is not possible to do so. We prove this idea in
this chapter as the two-dimensional Sperner’s lemma.
Before we discuss the idea in higher dimensions, let us state and prove the one-
dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Sperner’s lemma.
2.1.1 One-Dimensional Sperner’s Lemma
Here we consider the one-dimensional Sperner’s lemma. The lemma asserts that
in an n - tuple of 0s and 1s, the number of times a 0 comes next to a 1 is even if
we start and end with the same number and odd if we start and end at different
numbers. Formally, we have:
Lemma 2.1. (The One-Dimensional Sperner’s Lemma)
For n ≥ 2, in an n - tuple (a1, a2, ..., an) of 0s and 1s, the size of the set
{ j | aj−1 6= aj } is even if a1 = an and odd if a1 6= an.
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Proof. We prove the lemma using induction. Let Jn denote the set
{ j | aj−1 6= aj } for an n - tuple (a1, a2, ..., an) of 0s and 1s, and let | Jn |
represent the size of the set.
Base Case (n = 2) : When a1 = a2 , the possible 2 - tuples are (0, 0) and
(1, 1) . In both these cases, | J2 | is 0 which is even. When a1 6= a2 , the
possible 2 - tuples are (0, 1) and (1, 0). For both cases, | J2 | = 1 , which is an
odd number. Hence, the lemma holds for n = 2.
Induction hypothesis: In a k - tuple (a1, a2, ..., ak) of 0s and 1s,
| Jk | =
 even a1 = ak,odd a1 6= ak.
Now consider the (k + 1) - tuple (a1, ...ak, ak+1).
Case I: a1 = ak+1
1. If a1 = ak, then | Jk | is even (by the inductive hypothesis). Since
a1 = ak and a1 = ak+1, this means ak = ak+1. Thus, k + 1 /∈ Jk+1.
Then Jk+1 = Jk and hence | Jk+1 | is even.
2. If a1 6= ak, then Jk is odd (by the inductive hypothesis). Since
a1 = ak+1 and a1 6= ak, this means ak 6= ak+1. Thus, k + 1 ∈ Jk+1.
Then Jk+1 = Jk ∪ {k + 1} and hence | Jk+1 | = | Jk+1 | +1. Therefore,
| Jk+1 | is even.
Case II: a1 6= ak+1
1. If a1 = ak , then | Jk | is even (by the inductive hypothesis). Since
a1 6= ak+1 and a1 = ak, we get ak 6= ak+1. Therefore, k + 1 ∈ Jk+1. So
Jk+1 = Jk ∪ {k + 1} and | Jk+1 | = | Jk+1 | + 1. Thus, | Jk+1 | is odd.
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2. If a1 6= ak , then Jk is odd (by the inductive hypothesis). Since
a1 6= ak+1 and a1 6= ak, it follows that ak = ak+1. Thus k + 1 /∈ Jk+1.
This implies Jk+1 = Jk and hence | Jk+1 | is odd.
Hence we can conclude that
| Jk+1 | =
 even a1 = ak+1odd a1 6= ak+1
Thus, if the lemma holds for n = k, then it holds true for n = k + 1. By the
process of induction, we can conclude for all n that in an n-tuple (a1, a2, ...an)
of 0s and 1s, the size of the set { j | aj 6= aj+1 } is even if a1 = an and odd if
a1 6= an. With this, the proof of one-dimensional Sperner’s lemma is
complete.
2.1.2 Two-Dimensional Sperner’s Lemma
The one-dimensional Sperner’s lemma is crucial to understanding and proving
Sperner’s lemma in two dimensions. However, first let us outline what we mean
by some of the terms.
Assume that we have a triangulation of T and that the vertices of the
sub-triangles are labeled with 0, 1, or 2. Then an edge of T or of a
sub-triangle of T is called an (a0, a1) edge if its endpoints are labeled with a0
and a1. Moreover, a triangle in T is called an (a0, a1, a2) triangle if its vertices
are labeled a0, a1 and a2.
For the purpose of the discussion, the regions associated with the triangulation
of T are the interiors of the sub-triangles and the exterior of T .
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Definition. A triangulation of a triangle T with all of its sub-triangle vertices labeled
with 0, 1, or 2 is said to have a Sperner labeling if the sub-triangle vertices are
labeled according to the following rules (refer to Figure 2.2):
1. T is a (0, 1, 2) triangle,
2. Sub-triangle vertices on a side of T are not labeled with the same number as the
T vertex opposite to that side.
Figure 2.2. A Sperner Labeling
If a triangulation of T has a Sperner labeling, then by property (2) of the
labeling, all the sub-triangle vertices on the side of T that is opposite to the T
vertex labeled 2 are labeled with either 0 or 1. By the one-dimensional
Sperner’s lemma, that side has an odd number of (0, 1) sub-triangle edges. Also,
by property (2), there are no (0, 1) sub-triangle edges on the other two sides of
T. Thus, there is an odd number of (0, 1) sub-triangle edges on the boundary of T .
There is another concept that we need to define before we can state and prove
Sperner’s lemma, namely, p-paths.
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Definition. A permissible path or p-path is a path going from one region to another
region such that (refer to Figure 2.3):
1. It begins in a (0, 1, 2) sub-triangle or in the exterior of T ,
2. It ends in a (0, 1, 2) sub-triangle or in the exterior of T ,
3. It passes from one region to an adjacent region only through a (0, 1) sub-triangle
edge,
4. It does not pass through a (0, 1) sub-triangle edge more than once.
Figure 2.3. An example of a p-path
A collection of p-paths in T is called complete if for every (0, 1) sub-triangle
edge, there is a unique path in the collection that crosses it. It is not difficult to
show that p-paths and complete collections of them exist.
Assume we have a complete collection of p-paths. Since the collection of p-paths
is complete, every (0, 1) edge is crossed by some p-path. And therefore, every
(0, 1, 2) sub-triangle is visited by a p-path. This enables us then to "count" all
(0, 1, 2) sub-triangles in T . We can now use the concepts we have recently
outlined to state and prove Sperner’s lemma in two dimensions.
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Lemma 2.2. (The Two-Dimensional Sperner’s Lemma)
If a triangulation of a triangle T has a Sperner labeling, then there exists at least one
(0, 1, 2) sub-triangle in T. Moreover, there is an odd number of such sub-triangles.
Proof. Given a triangulation of a triangle T labeled with a Sperner labeling, we
show the existence of an odd number of (0, 1, 2) sub-triangles by working with
p-paths through T. Assume we have a complete collection of p-paths.
For any sub-triangle in T, the number of (0, 1) edges can be 0, 1 or 2 as we
can see in Figure 2.4 below. Here, (0, 1) edges of a sub-triangle are highlighted.
Figure 2.4. Number of (0, 1) edges in a sub-triangle is 0, 1 or 2
Note that if a sub-triangle has no (0, 1) edge, then no p-path meets it. If a
sub-triangle has exactly one (0, 1) edge, then a p-path that meets it must begin
or end in that sub-triangle, and that sub-triangle is a (0, 1, 2) triangle.
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Furthermore if a sub-triangle has two (0, 1) edges, then every p-path that enters
it also leaves it.
There are three types of p-paths in the collection (Figure 2.5):
1. Type I: p-paths that begin and end inside T. This means the path begins
and ends inside two distinct sub-triangles with exactly one (0, 1) edge in
each. Thus, each p-path of this type accounts for two (0, 1, 2)
sub-triangles. Also, note that such a p-path crosses an even number
(possibly none) of (0, 1) edges on the boundary of T .
2. Type II: p-paths that begin and end outside T. Each p-path of this type
does not account for any (0, 1, 2) sub-triangles and crosses an even
number of (0, 1) edges on the boundary of T .
3. Type III: p-paths that begin inside T and end outside T or vice-versa.
Each p-path of this type accounts for one (0, 1, 2) sub-triangle and crosses
an odd number of (0, 1) edges on the boundary of T .
Figure 2.5. Types of p-paths
Let ni denote the number of paths of Type i. Let the total number of (0, 1)
sub-triangle edges on the boundary of T be denoted by nE and the total
number of (0, 1, 2) sub-triangles in T be denoted by nT . From the above
17
discussion we know that Type I and Type II p-paths together account for an even
number of (0, 1) sub-triangle edges on the boundary of T and each Type III
p-path accounts for an odd number of (0, 1) sub-triangle edges on the
boundary of T.
Then for some α, β, γ ∈ Z≥ 0 :
nE = 2αn1 + 2βn2 + (2γ + 1)n3. (2.1)
Moreover, each Type I p-path accounts for two (0, 1, 2) sub-triangles and each
Type III p-path accounts for one (0, 1, 2) sub-triangle. Type II p-paths account
for no (0, 1, 2) sub-triangles. Then we get that:
nT = 2n1 + n3. (2.2)
As we already saw, there is an odd number of (0, 1) edges on the boundary of
T ; i.e. nE is odd. Then by Equation 2.1, n3 is odd. It follows from Equation 2.2
that nT is odd. In other words, there is an odd number of (0, 1, 2) sub-triangles
in T.
The completeness of the collection of p-paths in T ensures that every (0, 1, 2)
sub-triangle is included in the count. Thus there is an odd number of (0, 1, 2)
sub-triangles in T. This guarantees there is at least one (0, 1, 2) sub-triangle in
T and the proof of the two-dimensional Sperner’s lemma is complete.
Let us now look at Sperner’s lemma in dimension n.
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2.1.3 n-Dimensional Sperner’s Lemma
In the previous sections, we showed that Sperner’s lemma holds for the
one-dimensional and two-dimensional cases. The proof of Sperner’s lemma in
dimension n is very similar to the proof of the two-dimensional Sperner’s
lemma. However, before we state the lemma in n - dimensions, we need some
vocabulary to visualize and understand it better. Building upon the definitions
in the introductory chapter on simplices, faces, facets and subdivisions, here we
introduce some more terminology.
Assume we have a subdivision of an n - simplex S and that the vertices of
sub-simplices of S are labeled with numbers from {0, 1, ..., n}. A facet in S is
called an (a0, a1, ..., an−1) facet if its vertices are labeled a0, a1, ..., an−1. Also an
n - simplex in S is called an (a0, a1, ..., an) simplex if its vertices are labeled
a0, a1, ..., an.
As before, the regions associated with the subdivision of S are the interiors of
the sub-simplices and the exterior of S. Note that a subdivision that subdivides
a simplex also subdivides all the facets of the simplex. Then a sub-facet refers to
a facet of a sub-simplex, and the collection of all the sub-facets that lie on a facet
F of S gives a subdivision of F.
Definition. Given a subdivision of an n - simplex S with sub-simplex vertices in S
labeled with any number from the set {0, 1, ..., n}, the subdivision is said to have a
Sperner labeling if the sub-simplices are labeled according to the following rules:
1. S is a (0, 1, ..., n) simplex,
2. The vertices of sub-simplices on a facet of S do not have the same label as the
vertex opposite the facet.
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Assume we have a subdivision of S with a Sperner labeling. Note that the
(0, 1, ..., n− 1) facet of S is opposite the vertex of S labeled n and by (2), all
the sub-facet vertices that lie on the (0, 1, ..., n− 1) facet are not labeled n. Also,
by (2), we have that no other facet of S has (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets. Thus, on
the boundary of S, (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets lie only on the (0, 1, ..., n− 1) facet
of S.
As in the two-dimensional case, our proof of the n - dimensional Sperner’s
lemma uses p-paths, defined as follows:
Definition. A p-path in an n - simplex is defined as a path that:
1. begins in a (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplex or outside S,
2. ends in a (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplex or outside S,
3. crosses from one region to an adjacent region only through a (0, 1, ..., n− 1)
sub-facet,
4. crosses each (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facet exactly once.
Just like in the case of a two-dimensional simplex, a collection of p-paths is
complete if every (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facet is crossed by a unique path in the
collection. It is not difficult to see that complete collections of p-path exist. As in
the two-dimensional case, p-paths allow us to count the total number of
(0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplices in S.
We are now ready to state and prove the n - dimensional Sperner’s lemma.
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Lemma 2.3. (Sperner’s Lemma)
For each n = 1, 2, ..., there exists an odd number of (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplices in a
subdivision of an n - simplex S that has a Sperner labeling.
Proof. We will prove by induction on n that given a subdivision of an n -
simplex S and a Sperner labeling of the subdivision, there exists an odd
number of (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplices in S. The base case n = 1 follows from
the one-dimensional Sperner’s lemma that we proved before (see Lemma 2.1).
The induction hypothesis is that the lemma holds for n− 1, that is, for
subdivided (n− 1) - simplices with a Sperner labeling. With that assumption,
we will prove the result for n - simplices. So assume we have a subdivision of an
n - simplex S with a Sperner labeling.
By induction, the (0, 1, ..., n− 1) facet of S has an odd number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1)
sub-facets. Since on the whole boundary of S, (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets lie only
on the (0, 1, ..., n− 1) facet of S, the total number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets
on the boundary of S is odd.
Assume now that we have a complete collection of p-paths for the subdivision of
S. A sub-simplex inside S may have no (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets, in which case
no p-path meets it. If a sub-simplex has at least one (0, 1, ..., n− 1) facet, then
there are two possibilities for the label on the remaining vertex:
1. If the remaining sub-simplex vertex opposite the (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facet
is labeled n, the sub-simplex is a (0, 1, ..., n) simplex and it has exactly one
(0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facet. Then, a p-path either begins or ends in this
sub-simplex.
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2. If the remaining sub-simplex vertex opposite the (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facet
is labeled with any number other than n, that is any number from
{0, 1, ..., n− 1}, then it has exactly two (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets and it is
not a (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplex. Furthermore, a p-path enters and leaves the
sub-simplex.
Like the two-dimensional case, there are only three types of p-paths possible:
1. Type I: p-paths that begin and end in two distinct (0, 1, ..., n)
sub-simplices. Thus, a Type I p-path guarantees the existence of two
(0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplices and crosses an even number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1)
sub-facets on the boundary of S (each time it exits S, it does so through a
(0, 1, ...., n− 1) sub-facet and it must return to S through another).
2. Type II: p-paths that begin and end outside S. This type of path gives no
(0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplices and crosses an even number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1)
sub-facets on the boundary of S (each time it enters S, it does so through
a (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facet and it must exit S through another).
3. Type III: p-paths that begin inside a (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplex and end
outside S or vice-versa. Each Type III p-path gives exactly one (0, 1, ..., n)
sub-simplex and crosses an odd number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets on the
boundary of S.
Let ni denote the number of p-paths of Type i. Let the total number of
(0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets on the boundary of S be denoted by nF and the total
number of (0, 1, ..., n) simplices in S be denoted by nS.
Then from the above discussion, we know that each Type I and Type II p-path
accounts for an even number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets on the boundary of S
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and each Type III p-path accounts for an odd number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1)
sub-facets on the boundary of S. So for some α, β, γ ∈ Z≥ 0 :
nF = 2αn1 + 2βn2 + (2γ + 1)n3. (2.3)
Moreover, each Type I p-path accounts for two (0, 1, ..., n) simplices in S and
each Type III p-path accounts for one (0, 1, ..., n) simplex in S. Type II p-paths
give no (0, 1, ..., n) simplices in S. Then:
nS = 2n1 + n3. (2.4)
As we already saw, there is an odd number of (0, 1, ..., n− 1) sub-facets on the
boundary of S; i.e., nF is odd. Then by Equation 2.3, n3 is odd. It follows
from Equation 2.4 that nS is odd. In other words, there is an odd number of
(0, 1, ..., n) simplices in S. The completeness of the collection of p-paths in S
ensures that every (0, 1, ..., n) simplex is included in the count. Thus there is an
odd number of (0, 1, ..., n) simplices in S.
Hence, Sperner’s lemma holds for the n - dimensional case, assuming the
(n − 1) dimensional case, and by induction on n, we get that for all n, the
Sperner labeling of a subdivision of an n - dimensional simplex S gives an odd
number of (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplices in S.With that, the proof of the
n -dimensional Sperner’s lemma is complete.
Now that we have established Sperner’s lemma for all dimensions, let us
examine its application to fair-division problems, a branch of economics that has
gained prominence in the last half-century. In the next chapter, we will be using
this lemma to prove the Brouwer fixed point theorem, which in turn has various
applications in social sciences.
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2.2 Envy-Free Division in Economics
Economics is a behavioral science and in essence, it studies the problem of choice,
namely how to allocate resources, goods (or desirables) and bads (or
undesirables) in an economy. Distribution is basically a fair-division problem,
where fairness depends upon the outcome desired. For instance, the goal of
distribution may be to maximize social welfare or minimize negative
externalities (like pollution). Economists have been grappling with these
problems for centuries. Lately, there has been a growing focus on achieving
envy-free distribution in which each individual feels satisfied with their share and
does not vie for another individual’s share. Envy-free distribution sounds ideal
since it minimizes discontent and so maximizes happiness, however the
challenge lies in measuring a quality like envy in order to be able to make
considerations about it.
Many approaches have been proposed by mathematicians and economists who
have constructed models that lead to approximately envy-free distribution.
However, it was only after the development of Sperner’s lemma that the
existence of an envy-free division was established, keeping in mind certain
assumptions. When we talk about fair division of goods, it is difficult to
guarantee envy-free distribution as each individual vies for the best piece, and
here it has to be noted that the term "best" is subjective, depending on individual
preferences. Similarly, fair distribution of bads is difficult as every individual
wants the least share in it. A division which satisfies everyone simultaneously
seems hard to attain, yet as we shall see, Sperner’s lemma guarantees the
existence of such a division. To prove the existence of a fair distribution of
goods, we are going to use the approach used by Francis Edward Su in [2] who
attributed it to Forest Simmons.
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2.2.1 Cake-Cutting Dilemna
When a cake is divided between two people, fair division is possible using a
single cut if one person gets to cut the cake into two pieces while the other
person gets to choose the piece. This process motivates the first person to cut the
cake in a manner that she/he is indifferent between the two pieces and the
second person’s choice does not really affect them. Also, the second person gets
to choose the piece first so they will not envy the other person’s piece. In this
manner, an envy-free distribution can be achieved.
Is it possible to have an envy-free division of the cake between three people? It
does not seem obvious, yet given certain assumptions, there exists such a
division as we shall see in the approach given by Simmons. We have a cake
which is to be cut into three pieces using two cuts as shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6. Using two cuts to cut a cake into three pieces of size x1, x2, and x3
There are many ways in which these two cuts can be made. A set of cuts is
completely defined by the size of the three pieces it generates. We assume that
the total size of the cake is 1. Then a cake-cut is defined as a point (x1, x2, x3)
where xi is the size of the ith piece, such that
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (2.5)
3∑
i=1
xi = 1. (2.6)
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Let the three individuals be denoted by A, B and C. Plotting all possible
cake-cuts, we find that the space T of cake-cuts is the standard 2 -simplex in
R3. The coordinates of the vertices of T are (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1).
We shall now make some general assumptions that form the base of the model
we are constructing.
Assumptions:
1. People are rational and their choice for a piece or pieces for a cake-cut
depends only on which piece(s) they prefer the most and not on other
people’s choices. Note, this means that a person always chooses at least
one piece for each cake-cut.
2. People are hungry and so they always choose some piece over no piece, i.e.
a piece of any size is chosen over a piece of size 0.
3. The set of choices is closed, i.e., if an individual chooses a piece for a
convergent sequence of cake-cuts, the individual chooses that piece at the
limiting cake-cut.
Note that a piece is not necessarily chosen based on its size. A person may prefer
a particular piece of cake because it has more candy flowers on it or more
chocolate or some such reason. The only assumption that is made about piece
size is that nobody chooses pieces of size 0.
Given the above assumptions, it is possible to find at least one cake-cut where
each individual prefers a different piece, and this gives us the envy-free partition
we desire. We establish this formally in what follows.
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Definition. For α = A, B, and C, and x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ T, let Cα(x) be a
subset of {1, 2, 3}. We call the set-valued function Cα a choice function for person
α if:
1. Cα(x) 6= ∅ for all x ∈ T.
2. For all x = (x1, x2, x3), if xi = 0, then i /∈ Cα(x).
3. Cα is continuous.
Note that the three properties of a choice function in the above definition reflect
the corresponding assumptions listed previously. Also, if i ∈ Cα(x) for a
choice function Cα, we say that person α chooses piece i at cake-cut x.
Lemma 2.4. There exist arbitrarily fine triangulations of T with vertices labeled
A, B, and C such that each sub-triangle has vertices distinctly labeled A, B, and, C.
Figure 2.7. An example of arbitrarily fine triangulations of T
Proof. Given T with the vertex (1, 0, 0) labeled A, vertex (0, 1, 0) labeled B,
and vertex (0, 0, 1) labeled C, join the mid-points of AB, BC, and CA to
form a triangle and label these midpoints as C, A and B respectively (refer to
Figure 2.7). As we observe, each sub-triangle has vertices distinctly labeled
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A, B and C. We can continue to further divide each sub-triangle with vertices
distinctly labeled A, B and C into finer and finer sub-triangles and label them
as outlined above.
In this manner, for each n ∈ N, we have a triangulation Tn of T into
equal-sized equilateral sub-triangles such that the side lengths of the
sub-triangles go to 0 as n becomes infinite. Furthermore, each sub-triangle has
vertices labeled A, B, and C.
Then, the existence of the desired envy-free partition is established via the
following:
Theorem 2.1. Let CA, CB, CC be choice functions on T. There exists x ∈ T and
distinct α, β, γ among A, B, C such that 1 ∈ Cα(x), 2 ∈ Cβ(x), and
3 ∈ Cγ(x). Thus, at x ∈ T, each person can have a piece of cake that they choose.
Proof. Assume we have a sequence of labeled triangulations of T as described
in Lemma 2.4. Consider a triangulation Tn of T. Since each point in T
represents a cake-cut, we can create a new secondary labeling of the
triangulation using 1’s, 2’s, and 3’s such that if the vertex v is labeled with
person α, then we give it a secondary label i such that i ∈ Cα(v).
We claim that the labeling is a Sperner labeling (Figure 2.2). This is because no
one chooses a piece of size 0. So we can see that:
1. At the vertices, the only piece chosen (by any of the three - A, B or C) is
1 at (1, 0, 0), 2 at (0, 1, 0), and 3 at (0, 0, 1). Hence, the vertices are
labeled accordingly, and T is a (1, 2, 3) triangle.
28
2. Now consider the side of T connecting the vertices (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0).
All sub-triangle vertices on that side have coordinates (x1, x2, 0). At such a
cake-cut, none of A, B or C chooses piece 3. Therefore, no sub-triangle
vertex on that side is labeled with 3, that is, with the label on the vertex
(0, 0, 1) opposite to that side. Similarly, we can see that no vertex on the
side of T connecting the vertices (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) is labeled 2 and no
vertex on the side of T connecting the vertices (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) has
the label 1. Thus, vertices of sub-triangles on a side of T will not have the
same label as the vertex of T opposite to the side.
Thus, the labeling is a Sperner labeling. By Sperner’s lemma (Lemma 2.2), there
is at least one (1, 2, 3) sub-triangle in the triangulation Tn of T .
Each triangulation of T yields at least one (1, 2, 3) sub-triangle. For the
triangulation Tn, we denote that sub-triangle by Tn. The vertices of Tn are
labeled A, B, C and have the secondary labeling 1, 2, 3. For now, assume A
is labeled 1, B is labeled 2, and C is labeled 3. We denote the overall
labeling on such Tn by A1B2C3.
This means that at one vertex of Tn, A chooses piece 1 in that cake-cut, at
another vertex B chooses piece 2 for that cake-cut, and for the last vertex C
chooses piece 3 for that cake-cut. Note that this is not yet our desired envy-free
division because these are three different cake-cuts and not a single one where
A, B, and C choose distinct cake pieces. However, since we get smaller and
smaller (1, 2, 3) triangles for finer and finer triangulations, we can reach this
desired cake-cut through a limiting argument we use below.
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Note that there are six choice distributions possible for each Tn:
A1B2C3, A1B3C2, A2B1C3, A2B3C1, A3B1C2, A3B2C1
Since there are finitely many choice distributions and infinitely many Tn, at least
one choice distribution must repeat infinitely often. Without loss of generality,
assume it is A1B2C3; i.e., A chooses piece 1, B chooses piece 2 and C
chooses piece 3 at different vertices of Tn. Then for each of these sub-triangles,
take the vertex labeled A. They result in a sequence: v1, v2, v3, ... . Since this is
a sequence in a closed and bounded space T, it must have a sub-sequence that
converges to a point, say v. Since the size of sub-triangles of T becomes smaller
and smaller as n becomes infinite, the distance between the three vertices of the
triangles tends to 0. Thus, the corresponding sub-sequences of B and C
vertices also converge to v (by Theorem 1.2). At this limit point v, since the
choice functions are continuous, A chooses piece 1, B chooses piece 2 and C
chooses piece 3. Thus, v represents a cake-cut of T such that A, B, and C
prefer distinct pieces of the cake.
Hence, we are able to find at least one point in T, i.e. at lease one cake-cut, that
gives an envy-free division of the cake. With that, the proof of the theorem is
complete.
Note that a similar method can be adopted to find an envy-free division for
n + 1 individuals, using the n - dimensional Sperner’s lemma in the same way
that the two-dimensional lemma was used here.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BROUWER FIXED POINT THEOREM
In this chapter, we state and prove the Brouwer fixed point theorem, a theorem
of topology that was given in the 1912 publication Über Abbildung Von
Mannigfaltigkeiten [3] by the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer. This theorem
was inspired by the work done by French mathematician Henri Poincaré [4] in
the field of differential equations [5]. The Browuer fixed point theorem proves
the existence of fixed points for certain continuous functions. First let us define
what is meant by a fixed point of a (point-valued) function.
Definition. For any set X, a fixed point of a function f : X → X is a point x∗
such that
f(x∗) = x∗.
The knowledge of existence of fixed points for a function has various
applications in social sciences (as well as other fields, though we are not
discussing them in this paper). One such application is to prove the existence of
equilibrium strategies for games, an important topic of discussion in game
theory. In this chapter, we will use the Brouwer fixed point theorem to prove the
existence of Nash equilibria for non-cooperative games. In the next chapter, we
will use the Kakutani fixed point theorem to prove the existence of general
equilibria in economics.
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3.1 The Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem
Let us begin by formally stating and proving the Brouwer fixed point theorem in
one, two, and n dimensions. Just as in the case of Sperner’s lemma, the
Brouwer fixed point theorem in one-dimension is fairly intuitive. It can be easily
proved using the Intermediate Value theorem. For dimensions two and higher,
we use the corresponding Sperner’s lemma to prove the theorem. In particular,
the proof of the two-dimensional Brouwer fixed point theorem provides greater
understanding of the proof in higher dimensions.
3.1.1 The One-Dimensional Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem
The standard 1 - simplex is a line-segment in R2 given by
y = 1 − x ; x ≥ 0 , y ≥ 0.
This is homeomorphic to the line-segment
y = 0 ; 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Thus, it is enough to prove the Brouwer fixed point theorem for functions
mapping [0, 1] to [0, 1]. Let f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be continuous. Intuitively it is
clear that the graph of f must intersect the line y = x at some point (see
Figure 3.1), and this point is a fixed point of f since f(x) = x at such a point.
We will formally prove the one-dimensional Brouwer fixed point theorem using
the Intermediate Value theorem from calculus.
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Figure 3.1. The idea behind the One-Dimensional Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem
Theorem 3.1. Every continuous function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] has a fixed point.
Proof. Let f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be a continuous function. Note that f(0) ≥ 0 and
f(1) ≤ 1. Define g(x) = f(x) − x for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Since f is continuous,
g is also continuous. Moreover, g(0) ≥ 0 and g(1) ≤ 0. Then by the
Intermediate Value theorem, there exists at least one point c ∈ [0, 1] such that
g(c) = 0. This implies f(c) − c = 0. Therefore f(c) = c, and c is a fixed
point of f.
Hence, there exists at least one fixed point of f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. Thus, the
Brouwer fixed point theorem holds for dimension one.
3.1.2 The Two-Dimensional Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem
Just like in the case of Sperner’s lemma, the proof of the n-dimensional Brouwer
fixed point theorem is very similar to the proof of the theorem in dimension two.
Since it is easy to visualize a 2 - simplex in R3 , we will first look at the
two-dimensional Brouwer fixed point theorem and then proceed to prove the
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theorem in dimension n. Note that the standard 2 -simplex, T, is the
equilateral triangle with vertices (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1). The Brouwer
fixed point theorem is applicable to any space homeomorphic to T, for instance,
any 2 - disk in the plane.
Figure 3.2. A point x ∈ T
Let x = (x0, x1, x2) be a point in T . For the purpose of the proof, define the
regions associated with x as below:
1. R0(x) := {y ∈ T | y0 < x0},
2. R1(x) := {y ∈ T | y0 ≥ x0 ; y1 < x1},
3. R2(x) := {y ∈ T | y0 ≥ x0 ; y1 ≥ x1 ; y2 < x2}.
Figure 3.3. Regions associated with a point x ∈ T
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Figure 3.3 depicts the three regions for an arbitrary point x ∈ T. Before we
state and prove the Brouwer fixed point theorem in two dimensions, here are
some easily seen properties of these regions.
Lemma 3.1. For any point x ∈ S,
1. R0(x), R1(x), R2(x) are mutually disjoint.
2. R0(x) ∪ R1(x) ∪ R2(x) = T − {x}.
3. Cl (R0(x)) ∩ Cl (R1(x)) ∩ Cl (R2(x)) = {x}.
4. R0((1, 0, 0)) = S − {(1, 0, 0)} ,
R1((0, 1, 0)) = S − {(0, 1, 0)} ,
R2((0, 0, 1)) = S − {(0, 0, 1)}.
5. R2((x0, x1, 0)) = R1((x0, 0, x2)) = R0((0, x1, x2)) = ∅.
We do not prove Lemma 3.1. Instead we can see these relationships in the
figures as follows: Parts (1) and (2) are illustrated in Figure 3.3 ; Part (3) is
demonstrated in Figure 3.4; Part (4) is represented in Figure 3.5 ; and Part (5) is
illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.4. {x} = Cl (R0(x)) ∩ Cl (R1(x)) ∩ Cl (R2(x))
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Figure 3.5. Regions associated with the vertices of S
Figure 3.6. Regions associated with a point on a side of S
Next we introduce an important limit relationship for the regions.
Lemma 3.2. For j = 0, 1, 2 ; if (xn) → x, (yn) → y, and xn ∈ Rj(yn) for all
n, then x ∈ Cl (Rj(y))
The proof for this lemma is straightforward and it follows directly from
Theorem 1.3.
Let us now formally state and prove the two-dimensional Brouwer fixed point
theorem using the above lemmas.
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Theorem 3.2. Let T be the standard 2-simplex in R3. Every continuous function
f : T → T has a fixed point.
Proof. Given the standard simplex T , let f : T → T be an arbitrary continuous
function. Let T1,T2, .... be triangulations of T where each Ti+1 is generated
by further triangulating sub-triangles formed under Ti for all i . Also assume
that as i increases and tends to ∞ , the diameter of subdivision simplices tends
to 0.
If some sub-triangle vertex of T (over all triangulations) is a fixed point of f ,
then we are done. Now assume that no sub-triangle vertex v for any of the
triangulations of T is a fixed point of f . In other words, f(v) 6= v over all
vertices v in all triangulations of T . Since f(v) 6= v, parts (1) and (2) of
Lemma 3.1 imply that f(v) lies in exactly one of R0(v), R1(v), R2(v).
Label the vertex v with j if f(v) ∈ Rj(v). Then all sub-triangle vertices in T
are labeled with the numbers 0, 1, or 2 . Now by Lemma 3.1,
R0((1, 0, 0)) = S − {(1, 0, 0)}. This means f((1, 0, 0)) ∈ R0((1, 0, 0)) . Thus,
(1, 0, 0) is labeled 0 . Similarly, (0, 1, 0) is labeled 1 and (0, 0, 1) is labeled 2 .
(See Figure 3.5.) Hence T is a (0, 1, 2) triangle.
Figure 3.7. T is a (0, 1, 2) triangle
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Furthermore, sub-triangle vertices on a side of T do not have the same label as
the vertex opposite the side. For instance, vertices on the side of T connecting
the vertices (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) are not labeled 2. This is because a
sub-triangle vertex v on that side has the coordinates (x0, x1, 0). Then,
R2(v) = ∅ by Lemma 3.1, so f(v) /∈ R2(v), and hence v is not labeled 2.
Therefore, each triangulation Ti has a Sperner labeling (Figure 2.2). By
Sperner’s lemma, there exists at least one (0, 1, 2) sub-triangle in each
triangulation of T .
For each triangulation Ti, choose a (0, 1, 2) sub-triangle Ti. Let vik denote the
vertex of the sub-triangle Ti that is labeled k. By our labeling,
f(vik) ∈ Rk(vik). (3.1)
Consider the sequence (vi0) over all i . This is a sequence in a closed and
bounded space T, and hence, it must have a convergent subsequence. For
simplicity, assume the sequence itself converges. Let (vi0) → V as i → ∞
where V ∈ T. By continuity of f, we get that f(vi0) → f(V ). Furthermore,
since f(vi0) → f(V ) and f(vi0) ∈ R0(vi0), it follows by Lemma 3.2 that
f(V ) ∈ Cl (R0(V )). (3.2)
Also, the sequences of vertices of Ti labeled 1 and 2 converge to V since the
distance between the sub-simplex vertices tends to 0 as i → ∞ . Hence,
(vi1) → V and (vi2) → V (by Theorem 1.2). As before, by continuity of f and
Lemma 3.2, we get:
f(V ) ∈ Cl (R1(V )) and f(V ) ∈ Cl (R2(V )). (3.3)
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Combining 3.2 and 3.3, we get that:
f(V ) ∈ Cl (R0(V )) ∩ Cl (R1(V )) ∩ Cl (R2(V )). (3.4)
By Part (3) of Lemma 3.1, this means f(V ) = V. Thus, V is a fixed point of f.
So if no subdivision vertex is a fixed point of f, then some other point in T is.
Hence, the proof of the Brouwer fixed point theorem in two dimensions is
complete.
3.1.3 The n - Dimensional Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem
Let us prove the Brouwer fixed point theorem for the standard n - simplex S in
Rn+1. Note that if the theorem applies to the n - simplex, then it extends to all
spaces that are homeomorphic to the simplex, for instance, the closed unit ball
Bn in Rn where Bn = { x ∈ Rn : | x | ≤ 1 }.
Theorem 3.3. Let S be the standard n - simplex in Rn+1. Then every continuous
function f : S → S has a fixed point.
Proof. Given the standard n -simplex S in Rn+1, we want to show that every
continuous function f : S → S has a fixed point. Let S1,S2, ... be subdivisions
of S where each Si+1 is generated by further subdividing sub-simplices
formed under Si for all i. Assume that the diameter of sub-simplices tends to
0 as i → ∞.
Let f : S → S be an arbitrary continuous function. If some sub-simplex vertex
(over all subdivisions Si ) is a fixed point of f, then we are done. Now assume
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none of the sub-simplex vertices for any subdivision is a fixed point of f. In
other words, f(v) 6= v over all vertices v in all subdivisions Si of S.
For any x = (x0, x1, ..., xn) ∈ S, let
f(x) = f(x0, x1, ...., xn) = (f0(x), f1(x), ..., fn(x)).
Assume x is not a fixed point of f. So (x0, x1, ..., xn) 6= (f0(x), f1(x), ..., fn(x)).
Then by Lemma 1.1, there exists some k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} such that fk(x) < xk.
Label the point x with the number p such that
p = min { k = 0, 1, ..., n | fk(x) < xk}.
Note that the n+1 vertices of S have the coordinates (1, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1, ..., 0) , ...,
(0, 0, ..., 1). Since these vertices of S are not fixed points (as assumed before),
then according to the labeling, they must be labeled 0, 1, ..., n respectively. For
example, with f(0, 0, 1, ..., 0) = (a0, a1, ..., an), we have 0 ≤ a0, 0 ≤ a1, and
a2 < 1 (the latter holds because otherwise we would have a fixed point). So
(0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0) is labeled with 2. Thus, S is a (0, 1, ..., n) simplex.
Now fix a subdivision Si of S. Consider the vertex of S with 1 in the jth
entry. Then by our labeling, this vertex is labeled j. Let x be a point on the
facet opposite this vertex. Clearly, xj = 0. Then since fj(x) ≥ 0 , it follows
that x is not labeled j. Therefore, over all subdivisions Si, no sub-simplex
vertex is labeled j on the facet opposite the S vertex labeled j . Hence, each
subdivision Si has a Sperner labeling.
Therefore by Sperner’s lemma, there exists at least one (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplex
in S . Choose a (0, 1, ..., n) sub-simplex Si from each sub-division Si.
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Let vik be the vertex of Si labeled k . Consider the sequence (vi0) over all i.
Then this sequence, in a closed and bounded space S, must have a convergent
subsequence. For simplicity, assume the sequence itself converges. Let vi0 → v∗
as i → ∞ where v∗ is a point in S. Then the sequences formed by the other
vertices (vi1), (vi2), ..., (vin) also converge to v∗ since the distance between the
sub-simplex vertices tends to 0 as i → ∞ (by Theorem 1.2). We claim that the
limiting point v∗ ∈ S is actually a fixed point of f .
To prove the claim, let the point v∗ = (v∗0, v∗1, ..., v∗n). Let vik,m denote the mth
coordinate of vik. Note that for all k and i,
(vik,0) → v∗0, (vik,1) → v∗1, ..., (vik,n) → v∗n. (3.5)
Now vik has the label k. Then, by the labeling, we must have
fk(v
i
k) < v
i
k,k. (3.6)
Thus, from Equations 3.5 and 3.6 and Theorem 1.3,
fk(v
∗) ≤ v∗k for all k.
By Lemma 1.1, we have that
fk(v
∗) = v∗k for all k.
Hence,
f(v∗) = v∗.
In other words, v∗ is a fixed point of f. So if no subdivision vertex is a fixed
point of f, then some other point in S is. Therefore, the Brouwer fixed point
theorem holds for all n-dimensions (n ∈ N).
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3.2 Using the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem to Prove the Existence of Nash
Equilibria for Non-Cooperative Games
Equilibrium is often defined as a state of rest, where all counteracting forces
balance. In game theory, equilibrium means a state where all players are content
with the strategy they employ and have no reason to change it, given the
strategies of the other opponents. One of the main questions in game theory is to
determine whether equilibrium is attainable, and if so, what strategy must one
employ in a game in order to achieve it. John Nash proved the existence of
equilibria in a finite non-cooperative game using the generalized Kakutani fixed
point theorem, and later he presented a more straightforward proof of the same
using the Brouwer fixed point theorem [6]. In this section, we will first introduce
game theory and what is meant by an equilibrium in a finite non-cooperative
game. Then we will use the Brouwer fixed point theorem to prove the existence
of equilibria. Further, we will see its application in example games that we
introduce.
3.2.1 Introduction to Game Theory
The formal establishment of game theory as a field of study is credited to the
1944 publication Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by mathematician John
von Neumann and economist Oscar Morgenstern [7]. However, the roots of this
science can be traced as far back as two thousand years. The Babylonian
Talamud, the basis of all codes of Jewish laws and ethics, has the oldest known
reference to what is now referred to as the theory of cooperative games [8]. Even
the Spanish conquest of the Aztecs reflects the subtle use of game theory in
military tactics, when the Spanish conqueror Cortes scuttled his ships so that his
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military did not mutiny and flee back and also, to induce fear into the minds of
the Aztec people. As it happened, his strategy was successful and he won the
conquest [9]. It is an age-old question whether or not a situation necessarily has
an "outcome" that maximizes the welfare of everyone, given the choices made by
each person involved. And so the formal theory of games emerged to find
answers to these conundrums.
To begin with, a game is an interaction between participants of the game,
defined by a set of rules. Participants of a game are called players and these
players are responsible for making decisions, or choices, that determine the
outcome of the game. Note that the final outcome of the game is determined by
the combination of choices made by all players. A move is an action taken by a
player in a game. A non-cooperative game is a game without any coalition or
communication between the players that can influence their decision. Thus, in a
non-cooperative game, each player acts independently and tries to maximize his
or her own objective.
In this paper, we will focus our attention on single-move non-cooperative games
with finite players and finite choices for each player. Let us look at an example
two-player game. Suppose the two players are player X and player Y. The
game is played by having each player make exactly one move. In this game, each
player is asked to throw either a nickel or a quarter into a hat. The players make
the move simultaneously and cannot communicate their choice with the other
player beforehand. The final outcome of the game depends upon the rules of the
game and the choices made by both the players.
For instance, suppose the game rule was that if the coins match, player X gets
the coin player Y played (in addition to getting back the coin she/he played)
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and if the coins do not match, player Y gets both player X’s coins (in addition
to getting back the coin she/he played). Then depending upon the coin each
player chooses to put into the hat, either player X earns a profit or player Y
earns a profit. Note that the players do not know what the other player chooses.
However, it is safe to assume that, knowing the rules of the game, they both are
fully aware of all possible outcomes of the game and the question here is - What
are the best choices for each player when playing the game?
We are interested in examining the situation where a game is played multiple
times. Given the possible outcomes, the question is, what are the best overall
strategies the players can employ so that they can maximize their gains or
minimize their losses?
Let the ith player have ni available choices in the game. In our example, let N
and Q represent the choice of playing a nickel and of playing a quarter,
respectively. Then there are two choices available to each player, {N,Q}.
When a player makes the same choice for a move in every play of the game, the
player is said to have a pure strategy. A pure strategy of a player is independent
of the pure strategies of other players. In our example, if player X plays N all
the time, this strategy can be written as (1, 0) to indicate that player X plays
only N and never plays Q.
A player’s strategy set is the set of all the pure strategies of the player. Let the
strategy set of the ith player be { pi,τ | τ = 1, ...., ni}. Note that each pure
strategy pi,τ is written as an ni - dimensional vector, that is, pi1 = (1, 0, ..., 0),
pi,2 = (0, 1, ..., 0), ..., pi,ni = (0, 0, ..., 1). In our example, as we saw, the strategy
44
set of player X is {p1,1, p1,2} where p1,1 = (1, 0) and p1,2 = (0, 1). Similarly,
the strategy set of player Y is {p2,1, p2,2} where p2,1 = (1, 0) and p2,2 = (0, 1).
In general, playing a pure strategy is not an ideal tactic for a player because
making the same choice in every play of the game allows other players to guess
the player’s strategy and use that knowledge to maximize their own payoff at the
expense of this player. Instead, each player generally uses amixed strategy. This
means that the player assigns probabilities to the pure strategies available to
her/ him in order to incorporate an ambiguity in their decision making and
keep the other players guessing. Mixed strategies model real life situations since
they allow players to deviate from a fixed path, accounting for the human
decision-making element.
For player i, let si denote a mixed strategy where she/he plays the available ni
choices with differing probabilities over a large number of plays of the game. Let
the probability associated with the τ th choice be ατ . Clearly, each ατ ≥ 0 and
ni∑
τ=1
ατ = 1. (3.7)
Then we can represent this mixed strategy si as the n - tuple (α1, ..., ατ , ..., αni).
Each mixed strategy si can be thought of as a linear combination of the pure
strategies of player i, written as
si =
ni∑
τ=1
ατpi,τ (3.8)
where ni = number of choices available to the ith player,
ατ = probability associated with the τ th choice, and
pi,τ = pure strategy of the ith player to play the τ th choice.
45
It is obvious that there are infinitely many mixed strategies available to each
player, even when the strategy set is finite. By Equations 3.7 and 3.8, we can see
that the set of all possible mixed strategies for a player forms an (ni − 1) -
simplex Si whose vertices represent the pure strategies for that player. Thus, a
mixed strategy of a player is a point in the vector space formed by the span of all
the pure strategies of that player.
Again, referring back to our example of the two-player, two-choice game, we see
that the mixed strategies for player X is the set of points on the line segment in
R2 connecting p1,1 to p1,2. Similarly, the mixed strategies for player Y is the set
of points on the line segment in R2 connecting p2,1 to p2,2.
Let s = (s1, ..., sn) denote the n-tuple of mixed strategies of the n players.
Since each si is a point in a vector space spanned by the pure strategies of the
ith player, s can be geometrically understood as a point in the vector space that
is the product space of all vector spaces formed by the span of pure strategies of
each player. In our example, s = (s1, s2) ∈ R4, where s1 ∈ R2 is a mixed
strategy of player X and s2 ∈ R2 is a mixed strategy of player Y.
Each n - tuple of mixed strategies (s1, ..., sn) has an associated payoff,
pi = (pi1, ..., pin) that represents the outcome of the game if the players were to
choose that mixed strategy combination. Here, pii denotes the payoff for the ith
player, and it is determined, not only by the move made by the ith player, but
also by the moves of the other players. Thus, pii, the payoff to the ith player, is
a function of mixed strategies of all players,
pii (s) = pii (s1, ..., si, ..., sn).
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Since a mixed strategy for a player is a linear combination of the player’s pure
strategies and each player’s payoff depends not only on the choice made by them
but also on the choices made by other players, it is natural to assume that each
payoff function pii (s) is a linear combination of the payoffs associated with the
pure strategies of each of the players. That is, each payoff function is a linear
function of the payoffs corresponding to the pure strategies of all players, pi,τ
(where i = 1, ..., n and τ ranges from 1, ..., ni for each i ).
Definition. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy combination s such that the strategy
si chosen by the ith player maximizes the player’s payoff when the strategies of the other
players’ are assumed fixed. Thus, (s1, ...., sn) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i,
pii (s1, ...., si−1, si, si+1, ...., sn) = max
s ∈ Si
{pii (s1, ...., si−1, s, si+1, ...., sn)}. (3.9)
This equilibrium is known alternately as the best response equilibrium since "no player
can improve his expectation by changing his choice, the others being held fixed" [10].
In 1950, John Nash proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium for an n - player
finite-choice non-cooperative game using the generalized Kakutani fixed point
theorem [11]. However, in 1951, he published an alternate proof in the paper
Non-Cooperative Games that in his words was a "considerable improvement over
the earlier version and is based directly on the Brouwer theorem" [6]. Our
objective is to give a detailed perspective of how the Brouwer fixed point
theorem helps establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a 3 - player, 3 -
choice non-cooperative game. The method of proof carries over to n players
where each has ni choices in a game. Later, we will work out the algorithm to
find a Nash equilibrium for our two-person game outlined earlier in this section.
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3.2.2 Nash Equilibrium for 3 - Player, 3 - Choice Non-Cooperative Game
Assume we have a game with three players {1, 2, 3}, and assume that each
player has exactly three choices ai, bi and ci they can make for their move. Let
us represent the pure strategy vectors of the ith player by {Ai, Bi, Ci}. Here,
Ai = (1, 0, 0) represents the pure strategy of player i to make the choice ai one
hundred percent of the time. Similarly, Bi = (0, 1, 0) and Ci = (0, 0, 1). Thus
each player has a 2 - simplex of mixed strategies, given by:
Ti = {αAi + βBi + γCi | α, β, γ ≥ 0, α + β + γ = 1}. (3.10)
Here, α, β, γ represent the various frequencies (probabilities) at which each
choice ai, bi, ci is played by the ith player.
Each player has a payoff function pii : T1 × T2 × T3 → R. As discussed
previously, we assume that the payoff function of the ith player is linear on each
Ti. For instance,
pi1 (αA1+ βB1+ γC1 , s2, s3) = αpi1 (A1 , s2, s3)+ βpi1 (B1 , s2, s3)+ γpi1 (C1 , s2, s3).
(3.11)
As a consequence, for fixed s2 and s3, one of the following must hold:
1. The maximum of pi1 occurs at a single vertex of T1,
2. The maximum of pi1 occurs all along an edge of T1,
3. The maximum of pi1 occurs over all of T1, i.e., pi1 is constant on T1.
Similar statements can be made for the maximum of pi2 (for fixed s1 and s3)
and for the maximum of pi3 (for fixed s1 and s2).
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Note that (s1, s2, s3) is a Nash equilibrium if
pi1 (s1, s2, s3) = max
s ∈ T1
{pi1 (s, s2, s3)},
pi2 (s1, s2, s3) = max
s ∈ T2
{pi2 (s1, s, s3)},
pi3 (s1, s2, s3) = max
s ∈ T3
{pi3 (s1, s2, s)}.
(3.12)
The ideas of "perturbation" and "improvement" that we introduce next will assist
us in our proof of the existence of Nash equilibria. Now, for α′, β′, γ′ ≥ 0, if
we adjust a mixed strategy si ∈ Ti by relative amounts α′, β′, γ′ towards the
pure strategies Ai, Bi, Ci, the resulting mixed strategy s′i, defined as
s′i =
si + α
′Ai + β′Bi + γ′Ci
1 + α′ + β′ + γ′
∈ Ti (3.13)
is called the perturbation of si by [α′, β′, γ′].
Define
IA1 (s1, s2, s3) = max {0, pi1(A1, s2, s3) − pi1(s1, s2, s3)}. (3.14)
We call IA1 the A1−improvement of pi1. It measures by howmuch the payoff of
Player 1 increases, if any, by switching from mixed strategy s1 to pure strategy
A1, given that Players 2 and 3 continue to use mixed strategies s2 and s3,
respectively. We similarly define IB1 , IC1, IA2, IB2, IC2, IA3, IB3, and IC3 .
Theorem 3.4. (s1, s2, s3) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if IAi = IBi = ICi = 0
for i = 1, 2, 3.
Proof. Clearly, if IAi = IBi = ICi = 0 for all i, this means the payoff each
player receives from the mixed strategy si is maximum, given that the other
players’ strategies are fixed. Hence, (s1, s2, s3) is a Nash equilibrium.
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Now, let us assume that (s1, s2, s3) is a Nash equilibrium. We want to show that
IAi = IBi = ICi = 0 for all i. Without loss of generality, let us assume the
strategies of players 2 and 3 are fixed as s2 and s3 respectively. (s1, s2, s3) is
a Nash equilibrium, so by Equation 3.12, we know that
pi1 (s1, s2, s3) ≥ pi1 (A1, s2, s3),
pi1 (s1, s2, s3) ≥ pi1 (B1, s2, s3),
pi1 (s1, s2, s3) ≥ pi1 (C1, s2, s3).
Hence, by equation 3.14, IA1 (s1, s2, s3) = IB1 (s1, s2, s3) = IC1 (s1, s2, s3) = 0.
We can make similar arguments for players 2 and 3. Thus (s1, s2, s3) being a
Nash equilibrium implies that for all i,
IAi (s1, s2, s3) = IBi (s1, s2, s3) = ICi (s1, s2, s3) = 0.
Therefore, we conclude that (s1, s2, s3) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
IAi = IBi = ICi = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
Theorem 3.5. A Nash equilibrium exists for a 3-player, 3-choice, non-cooperative game.
Proof. For (s1, s2, s3) ∈ T1 × T2 × T3, let s′i denote the perturbation of si by
[IAi, IBi, ICi,] in Ti for i = 1, 2, 3. Then,
f (s1, s2, s3) = (s
′
1, s
′
2, s
′
3) (3.15)
defines a continuous function f : T1 × T2 × T3 → T1 × T2 × T3. Since
T1 × T2 × T3 is homeomorphic to the 6-dimensional closed ball, it follows by the
Brouwer fixed point theorem that f has a fixed point (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3).
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We claim that (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3) is a Nash equilibrium and we prove this by showing
that at (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3), we have IAi = IBi = ICi = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
Note that since (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3) is a fixed point of f,
f(s∗1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) = (s
∗
1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3). (3.16)
Then, by Equation 3.13, for each i,
s∗i =
s∗i + IAiAi + IBiBi + ICiCi
1 + IAi + IBi + ICi
. (3.17)
Let us consider the payoffs for player 1, keeping the strategy choices of players
2 and 3 fixed as s∗2 and s∗3. In T1 , without loss of generality, we may assume
that
pi1 (A1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) ≤ pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) ≤ pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3). (3.18)
We divide the analysis into three distinct cases:
1. pi1 (A1, s∗2, s∗3) = pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) = pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3),
2. pi1 (A1, s∗2, s∗3) = pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) < pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3),
3. pi1 (A1, s∗2, s∗3) < pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) ≤ pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3).
We consider each case separately.
Case I : pi1 (A1, s∗2, s∗3) = pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) = pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3).
By linearity of the payoff function over T1, the payoff of player 1 is constant
over T1. Thus, IA1 = IB1 = IC1 = 0.
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Case II : pi1 (A1, s∗2, s∗3) = pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) < pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3).
Since the payoff function is linear over T1, the payoff of player 1 is constant and
minimum along the edge of T1 that connects the two pure strategy vertices A1
and B1. Hence, IA1 = IB1 = 0. Then, by Equation 3.17,
s∗1 =
s∗1 + IC1C1
1 + IC1
. (3.19)
Now, s∗1 is a mixed strategy and can be represented as
s∗1 = α
∗A1 + β∗B1 + γ∗C1 , where α∗ + β∗ + γ∗ = 1. (3.20)
Thus, in Equation 3.19,
α∗A1 + β∗B1 + γ∗C1 =
α∗A1
1 + IC1
+
β∗B1
1 + IC1
+
(γ∗ + IC1) C1
1 + IC1
.
Since A1, B1, and C1 are independent vectors, we have
α∗ =
α∗
1 + IC1
, β∗ =
β∗
1 + IC1
, γ∗ =
γ∗ + IC1
1 + IC1
. (3.21)
Here there are two sub-cases:
1. If either α∗ or β∗ is non-zero, then 1 + IC1 = 1, so IC1 = 0.
2. If both α∗ = β∗ = 0, then γ∗ = 1 and s∗1 = C1 = (0, 0, 1). Then, by
definition (as seen in Equation 3.14), IC1 = 0.
Thus, in Case II, we get IA1 = IB1 = IC1 = 0.
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Case III : pi1 (A1, s∗2, s∗3) < pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) ≤ pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3).
Linearity of the payoff function over T1 implies that the payoff of player 1 is
minimum for the pure strategy A1. Hence, IA1 = 0. By Equation 3.17,
s∗1 =
s∗1 + IB1B1 + IC1C1
1 + IB1 + IC1
. (3.22)
As before, s∗1 is a mixed strategy and can be represented as in Equation 3.20.
Thus,
α∗A1 + β∗B1 + γ∗C1 =
α∗A1
1 + IB1 + IC1
+
(β∗ + IB1)B1
1 + IB1 + IC1
+
(γ∗ + IC1)C1
1 + IB1 + IC1
.
Since A1, B1, C1 are independent vectors, we have
α∗ =
α∗
1 + IB1 + IC1
, β∗ =
(β∗ + IB1)
1 + IB1 + IC1
, γ∗ =
(γ∗ + IC1)
1 + IB1 + IC1
. (3.23)
Again, there are two sub-cases here:
1. If α∗ 6= 0, then 1 + IB1 + IC1 = 1 . Hence, IB1 + IC1 = 0. Since IB1
and IC1 are non-negative, this forces IB1 = IC1 = 0.
2. If α∗ = 0, then by Equation 3.20, β∗ + γ∗ = 1. This means that s∗1 is on
the segment connecting B1 and C1. Since pi1 (B1, s∗2, s∗3) ≤ pi1 (C1, s∗2, s∗3),
it follows by the linearity of the payoff function over T1 that on the
segment, the payoff of player 1 is minimum for the pure strategy B1.
Hence, IB1 = 0. Then by equation 3.23, we have
β∗ =
β∗
1 + IC1
, γ∗ =
(γ∗ + IC1)
1 + IC1
. (3.24)
Now β∗ can be zero or non-zero.
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(a) If β∗ 6= 0, then 1 + IC1 = 1 and hence, IC1 = 0.
(b) If β∗ = 0, then γ∗ = 1 in Equation 3.20. In other words,
s∗1 = C1 = (0, 0, 1). As before, IC1 = 0 by definition.
Hence, in Case III, we have IA1 = IB1 = IC1 = 0.
Summarizing over all three possible cases, we conclude that
IA1 (s
∗
1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) = IB1 (s
∗
1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) = IC1 (s
∗
1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) = 0. (3.25)
The same argument holds for players 2 and 3 , and therefore,
s∗i =
s∗i + IAiAi + IBiBi + ICiCi
1 + IAi + IBi + ICi
implies that IAi (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3) = IBi (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3) = ICi (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
Thus, by Theorem 3.4, (s∗1, s∗2, s∗3) is a Nash equilibrium.
Note that this proof can be extended to establish existence of a Nash equilirium
for n players in a non-cooperative game where the ith player has τi pure
strategies.
3.2.3 Example of a 2 - Player, 2 - Choice Game
Working with our example of a 2 - player game that we have been referring to,
let us look at an algorithm that will enable us to determine Nash equilibria for
the game.
Recall that the two players X and Y had two choices each {N,Q}. Also, the
pure strategies for players X and Y are {p11, p12} and {p21, p22} respectively.
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Suppose X chooses to play N with probability p. Since there are only two
choices available to player X, it means that player X chooses Q with the
probability 1 − p. Similarly, player Y chooses N with probability q and Q
with probability 1 − q. So the mixed strategies of players X and Y are
(p, 1 − p) and (q, 1 − q), respectively.
For each combination of strategies of the two players, there is an attached payoff.
Tabulating all this data gives us the payoff matrix for the game. Any entry in the
matrix, written as (pi1, pi2), shows the payoffs to the two players given the choice
combination. Note that pi1, and pi2 depend upon the choices made by both
players X and Y. In this paper, we will limit ourselves to examining two
example games and the Nash equilibria in each case.
3.2.3.1 Game I
As we saw before, suppose the game rule is that if the coins match, player X
gets player Y ’s played coin and if the coins do not match, player Y gets both of
player X’s coins. Then the payoffs, or profits here, will be given by:
Available Player Y
Choices N Q
Player X
N (5,−5) (−30, 30)
Q (−30, 30) (25,−25)
Table 3.1. Payoff matrix I
Here, the entry (5,−5) means that if player X plays N and player Y also
plays N, then the payoff to player X is 5 cents and to player Y is −5 cents
(that is, player Y loses 5 cents).
55
To find a Nash equilibrium, we begin by examining the payoffs to each player
when they play pure strategies and the other player can play any mixed strategy.
In our example, the payoff for player X from choosing to play the pure strategy
p11 = (1, 0) (that is, play a nickel every time) depends upon the probability q
that player Y chooses to play N and the probability 1 − q that player Y
chooses strategy Q. Thus the payoff for player X from choosing the pure
strategy p11 is given by:
pi1 = (5)q + (−30)(1 − q) = 35q − 30 . (3.26)
By the same argument, the payoff for player X from choosing the pure strategy
p12 is given by:
pi1 = (−30)q + (25)(1 − q) = 25 − 55q . (3.27)
If we graph both these equations (Figure 3.8), they intersect at q∗ = 11
18
. We
claim that this is the Nash equilibrium strategy for player Y, that is, to play a
nickel 11 out of 18 times.
Figure 3.8. q∗ = 11
18
is a Nash equilibrium strategy
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Let q0 <
11
18
be fixed. Given this mixed strategy for player Y, all possible
payoffs for player X lie on the part of the line q = q0 between the two pure
strategy payoff lines of player X. Given that player Y is playing mixed strategy
(q0, 1− q0), player X’s best response then is to play the pure strategy
p12 = (0, 1). This does not yield a Nash equilibrium strategy, however, because
if player X plays pure strategy p12, player Y will maximize her/his payoff by
playing the pure strategy p21 = (1, 0), and not playing (q0, 1− q0).
So a Nash equilibrium does not occur when player Y plays mixed strategy
(q0, 1− q0) with q0 < 11
18
. A similar argument shows there is no Nash
equilibrium possible when player Y plays mixed strategy (q0, 1− q0) with
q0 >
11
18
either. Note that when player Y plays the mixed strategy (q∗, 1− q∗)
with q∗ = 11
18
, all mixed strategies for player X provide the same payoff, so in
this case, the payoff to player X is maximized with every choice of mixed
strategy. Thus, pi1 is maximized at mixed strategy
(
11
18
,
7
18
)
for player Y, that
is, when player Y chooses to play the nickel 11 out of every 18 games.
A similar analysis yields that when player X plays the mixed strategy(
11
18
,
7
18
)
, the payoff for player Y is maximized for every choice of mixed
strategy for player Y.
It follows that the Nash equilibrium for the game is at the mixed strategy
combination
s =
( (
11
18
,
7
18
)
,
(
11
18
,
7
18
) )
.
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3.2.3.2 Game II
Suppose the game rule is that if the coins played by the two players match, each
player gets twice the amount they put in. If they do not match, the coins are
exchanged, that is, each player gets the coin played by the other. Then the
payoffs will be given by:
Available Player Y
Choices N Q
Player X
N (5, 5) (20,−20)
Q (−20, 20) (25, 25)
Table 3.2. Payoff matrix II
When we analyze the best response of each player to the strategies chosen by the
other player, we find that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this
game. This is because if player Y plays N all of the time, then player X
receives maximum payoff by playing N all the time as well, and vice versa.
Thus, the pure strategy combination ((1, 0), (1, 0)) is a Nash equilibrium.
By a similar argument, there is also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium at
((0, 1), (0, 1)), having both players play Q all of the time. Thus, the two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game are at (p11, p21) and (p12, p22). Note
that in Game I, there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria since there is no pure
strategy combination that is a mutual best response to the other players’ strategy.
By an analysis similar to the one we did for the first example, we find that the
game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium at
s =
((
1
6
,
5
6
)
,
(
1
6
,
5
6
))
.
58
There is a notion of stability for Nash equilibria. We don’t address it formally
here but in a 2 - player game, a Nash equilibrium is stable if when either player
makes a small change in strategy, the other player has no incentive to change
her/his strategy and the player who made change is then compelled to return to
playing the strategy at Nash equilibrium that they deviated from. On the other
hand, a Nash equilibrium is unstable if a small change in strategy by one player
induces the other player to make a major change in her/his strategy.
In our example game, Game II, we can see that the pure strategy Nash equilibria
are stable. For instance, if the two players are playing with Nash equilibrium
strategy combination (p11, p21) and player Y chooses to play Q instead of N,
player X will continue to play N as she/he is actually getting a higher payoff
with the change. Player Y on the other hand will lose 20 cents instead of
earning 5 cents and will be forced to revert to the original strategy of playing N
all the time. Also, by a similar argument, it can be seen that the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium for this game is unstable since even a small change in strategy
by one player will create responses that will cause both players to move away
from that Nash equilibrium strategy to one of the pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Clearly, depending on the game rules and the resultant payoffs, equilibrium
strategies for games will vary. It is an interesting exercise to determine the Nash
equilibria for different games and examine their stability.
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CHAPTER 4
THE KAKUTANI FIXED POINT THEOREM
Another theorem with important economic applications is the Kakutani fixed
point theorem given by Shizuo Kakutani in 1941 as a generalization of the
Brouwer fixed point theorem [12]. Though it is not as intuitive as the Brouwer
fixed point theorem since it deals with set-valued functions and hence is more
difficult to visualize, the theorem found popularity in mathematical economics,
especially after John Nash used it to prove the existence of equilibrium points in
n player games [11]. In this paper, we use the Brouwer fixed point theorem to
prove the Kakutani fixed point theorem and then use the latter to prove the
existence of equilibria in a pure exchange economy.
Before that, let us first understand what is meant by fixed points of set-valued
functions.
Definition. For a set-valued function, f : X → P(X), a fixed point is a point that
is mapped to a set containing itself. In other words, x is a fixed point of f if
x ∈ f(x).
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4.1 The Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem
Recall that the Brouwer fixed point theorem proves the existence of fixed points
for point-valued functions. We will see in the subsequent sections that the
Kakutani fixed point theorem asserts the existence of fixed points for set-valued
functions. As we proceed, we will find that the former theorem is helpful in
understanding and proving the latter. Let us begin by stating and proving the
Kakutani fixed point theorem in one dimension.
4.1.1 The One-Dimensional Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem
Theorem 4.1. Let f : [0, 1] → P([0, 1]) be a continuous function such that for every
x ∈ [0, 1], the image f(x) is an interval in [0, 1]. Then there exists x ∈ [0, 1] such
that x ∈ f(x) .
[Note: we assume that for each x in [0, 1] , its image is an interval [a, b], (a, b],
[a, b), or (a, b) in [0, 1]. The importance of this assumption will become clear in
the proof.]
Proof. Let n ∈ N be arbitrary. Subdivide [0, 1] into n sub-intervals of equal
width
[
j
n
,
j + 1
n
]
where 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. For each j
n
, where j = 0, ..., n,
pick a point qj,n ∈ f
(
j
n
)
.
Define a point-valued function gn : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that
gn
(
j
n
)
= qj,n
and gn maps linearly on each sub-interval
[
j
n
,
j + 1
n
]
(See Figure 4.1).
61
Figure 4.1. An example of constructing gn for n = 20
Note that gn is a point-valued continuous function mapping [0, 1] → [0, 1].
Then by the one-dimensional Brower fixed point theorem, gn has a fixed point
xn.
Suppose xn ∈
[
in
n
,
in + 1
n
]
. Then
xn = αn
(
in
n
)
+ (1 − αn)
(
in + 1
n
)
for some αn ∈ [0, 1]. (4.1)
Since gn is a linear function on sub-intervals, we have
gn(xn) = αn
[
gn
(
in
n
)]
+ (1 − αn)
[
gn
(
in + 1
n
)]
. (4.2)
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Recall that
gn
(
in
n
)
= qin,n and gn
(
in + 1
n
)
= qin+1,n
are chosen such that
qin,n ∈ f
(
in
n
)
and qin+1,n ∈ f
(
in + 1
n
)
.
Thus, by Equation 4.2, we get
gn(xn) = αn qin,n + (1 − αn) qin+1,n . (4.3)
Now, xn is a fixed point of gn and hence, by Equation 4.3,
xn = gn(xn) = αn qin,n + (1 − αn) qin+1,n . (4.4)
Combine the sequences (xn) , (αn) , (qin,n) , and (qin+1,n) into a sequence
(xn , αn, qin,n , qin+1,n) in [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1]. This is a sequence in a
closed and bounded space, so it has a convergent subsequence. Just like we did
before, for simplicity, assume that the original sequence converges. So assume
(xn) converges to x ∈ [0, 1] , (qin,n) converges to q0 ∈ [0, 1] , (qin+1,n)
converges to q1 ∈ [0, 1] and (αn) converges to α ∈ [0, 1].
We claim that x is a fixed point of f , that is, x ∈ f(x). To prove the claim, we
begin by taking the limit in Equation 4.4 in order to obtain
x = α q0 + (1 − α) q1. (4.5)
Note that, by Theorem 1.2,(
in
n
)
→ x and
(
in + 1
n
)
→ x
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since xn ∈
[
in
n
,
in + 1
n
]
and the length of the sub-intervals
[
in
n
,
in + 1
n
]
goes to
0. Also, since qin,n → q0 and qin,n ∈ f
(
in
n
)
, it follows by the continuity of f
that
q0 ∈ f(x).
Similarly, q1 ∈ f(x). Since f(x) is an interval in R , it follows that
αq0 + (1 − α)q1 ∈ f(x). (4.6)
In other words, x ∈ f(x) as claimed. Hence, x is a fixed point of f, and the
one-dimensional Kakutani fixed point theorem is proved.
4.1.2 Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem in n Dimensions
Generalizing the one-dimensional result, we have the following n - dimensional
Kakutani fixed point theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Given the standard n - simplex S and a continuous set-valued function
f : S → P(S) such that f(x) ⊂ S is convex for all x ∈ S, then f has a fixed
point in S.
Proof. Let f : S → P(S) be a continuous function such that f(x) is a convex
subset of S for all x ∈ S.
As we did before for an n - dimensional simplex, take finer and finer
subdivisions S1,S2, ....,Si, .... such that the diameter of sub-simplices goes to 0
as i → ∞. Let V = {vi,1, ...., vi,ni} be the set of all of the vertices of the
sub-simplices of S in the ith subdivision.
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Define fi : S → S such that fi(vi,j) ∈ f(vi,j) for all j and such that fi
extends linearly over sub-simplices. Note that fi is a continuous point-valued
function mapping S to itself. Thus, by the n-dimensional Brouwer fixed point
theorem, fi has a fixed point xi in S.
Since xi lies in some sub-simplex in the ith subdivision of S, it can be expressed
as:
xi = αi,0wi,0 + ....+ αi,nwi,n (4.7)
where wi,0, ...., wi,n ∈ V are the vertices of the sub-simplex containing xi, each
αi,k ∈ [0, 1], and
n∑
k=0
αi,k = 1. (4.8)
Let fi(wi,k) = ui,k. Since wi,k ∈ V, by definition of fi, it follows that
ui,k ∈ f(wi,k).
From Equation 4.6, we get that
fi(xi) = αi,0fi(wi,0) + ....+ αi,nfi(wi,n) = αi,0ui,0 + ....+ αi,nui,n (4.9)
since fi is a linear function on subsimplices in Si. Moreover, we know that xi
is a fixed point of fi and so, fi(xi) = xi. Thus,
xi = αi,0ui,0 + ....+ αi,nui,n. (4.10)
We have sequences indexed by i : (xi) in S, (αi,k) in [0, 1] for each k, (ui,k) in
S for each k. By our usual convergence arguments, we can find sub-sequences
of each of these sequences converging simultaneously to limits for each. For
simplicity, we assume that the above sequences themselves converge.
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So assume xi → x ∈ S, αi,k → αk ∈ [0, 1] for each k, and ui,k → uk ∈ S
for each k. We claim that x is a fixed point of f. That is, x ∈ f(x).
First note that xi is in the subdivision simplex with vertices wi,0, ...., wi,n and
the subdivision simplices have diameters that go to 0 as i becomes infinite. It
follows, by Theorem 1.2, that each sequence (wi,k) also converges to x as
i → ∞.
So for each k, ui,k ∈ f(wi,k), ui,k → uk, and wi,k → x. By the continuity of
f, it follows that uk ∈ f(x) for all k.
Furthermore, taking the limit as i → ∞ in Equations 4.8 and 4.10, we obtain
n∑
k=1
αk = 1 (4.11)
x = α0u0 + ....+ αnun (4.12)
where αk ∈ [0, 1] for all k . Thus, since each uk ∈ f(x), and f(x) is convex, it
follows that x ∈ f(x).
Hence, x is a fixed point of f and we have proved the Kakutani fixed point
theorem for dimension n.
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4.2 An Application of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem to Equilibrium in
Economic Models
Recall that an equilibrium is a state of rest where opposing forces balance. In
economic models, equilibrium in a goods market refers to a point where the
supply of goods meets the demand for them. At this stage, there is no tendency
within the market for the price to change. Thus, the balance of demand and
supply remains undisturbed at equilibrium, unless affected by external forces.
In this section, we use the Kakutani fixed point theorem to show the existence of
equilibria in a pure exchange economy, that is, an economy where there is no
production.
Let us assume the economy is a pure exchange economy. All economic agents
are consumers and have an initial endowment of goods. Thus, the total amount
of each good in the economy is fixed and consumption depends upon initial
endowments as well as exchange (trade) between consumers.
Suppose there are m consumers and n goods in the economy. Each consumer
is endowed with a bundle of goods. Let the bundle of goods owned by the ith
person be
bi = (bi1, b
i
2, ..., b
i
n)
where bij represents the quantity of good j that the ith consumer has.
Since there is no production, the supply of goods in the economy is fixed and
can be found by summing up the bundles of goods owned by each consumer. So
the fixed supply vector is
s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) where sj =
m∑
i=1
bij for all j = 1, ..., n. (4.13)
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Each good has a relative price or value, pj, associated to it. We assume these
prices are non-negative (pj ≥ 0) and are normalized to sum to 1
(
that is,
n∑
j=1
pj = 1
)
. In the latter sense, they are relative prices.
We call the vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) a price vector. The set of all price vectors
forms an (n− 1)− simplex, S ∈ Rn with vertices (1, 0, ..., 0), (0, 1, ..., 0), ...,
(0, 0, ..., 1).
In an exchange economy, the wealth of the ith consumer, wi, is completely
determined by the value of the goods owned by her/him. It is defined by
wi = bi · p. (4.14)
A demand vector for the ith individual is of the form
d i(p) = (d i1 (p), d
i
2 (p), ..., d
i
n(p))
where dj i is the demand for good j by the ith consumer and it is a function of
the prices of all the goods in the economy. In our analysis, we are making the
reasonable assumption that the demand for a good by a consumer is not a fixed
amount but can be within a range. This means that the consumer has a
minimum and maximum amount of the good that she/he wants. However,
since the wealth of every consumer is fixed (it depends upon the initial
endowment), when a consumer demands more of one good, they automatically
have to demand less of another good. Therefore, the budget constraint coupled
with the range of preferences of the ith consumer gives rise to a set of demand
vectors, Di(p), from which she/he can choose, corresponding to a given price
vector, p. That is,
Di(p) = { d i(p) | d i(p) = (d i1 (p), d i2 (p), ..., d in(p)) }. (4.15)
68
We call Di(p) the demand set (for consumer i at price p). Given that each
consumer cannot demand more than they can afford, the value of each demand
vector equals the wealth of the consumer. Thus, for each d i ∈ Di(p),
d i · p = bi · p . (4.16)
Each Di(p) is set valued. Given the price p, Di(p) represents the different
bundles of goods the ith consumer can afford and would be equally happy
possessing; in other words, she/he would be indifferent between these bundles.
We assume that the mapping from p to the set Di(p) is continuous, reflecting
that a small change in p should result in only a small change in the demand.
Given any two demand vectors v1 and v2 in the set Di(p), we claim that the
consumer can afford any linear combination of the two demand vectors, that is
any v such that
v = t v1 + (1− t) v2 ; t ∈ [0, 1].
To prove this claim, we get from Equation 4.16 that
v1 · p = bi · p = v2 · p
and therefore, using Equation 4.14,
v · p = t v1 · p + (1− t) v1 · p = t bi · p + (1− t) bi · p = bi · p = wi.
Thus, the consumer can afford any linear combination of two demand vectors.
We assume that if the consumer prefers two bundles of goods, then the
consumer will be equally happy with a linear combination of the two bundles.
By this assumption, any linear combination of two demand vectors is also a
demand vector at price p. In other words, we assume that each Di(p) is convex.
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The assumption that Di(p) is a convex set will come in useful later in
establishing the premise for the Kakutani fixed point theorem, as we will see.
For a given price, p, the aggregate demand in the economy can be found by
summing up all possible individual demands over all consumers. Thus, we
define the overall demand by
D(p) =
{ m∑
i=1
d i | d i ∈ Di(p) for all i
}
. (4.17)
Since each Di(p) is a convex set, we can see that D(p) is convex in Rn.
The excess demand for a good is the difference between its demand at a given
price and the supply. Thus, excess demand is a function of price. For a price p,
the excess demand is the set
E(p) = { e | e = d − s ; d ∈ D(p) }. (4.18)
Note that E(p) ⊂ Rn is a convex set, since the supply vector s is fixed and
D(p) is a convex set for each p.
In Equation 4.16, summing over all m consumers, we get that for each
d ∈ D(p),
p · d = p · s . (4.19)
Thus, for each e ∈ E(p),
p · e = 0. (4.20)
Geometrically speaking, each e ∈ E(p) is orthogonal to p in Rn. This is
known as the Walrasian law [13] in general equilibrium theory. This means the
value of excess demand in the economy is always zero, whether or not there is
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equilibrium in the economy. So, the sum of values of excess demand across all
goods must be zero; that is, if positive excess demand exists for some goods,
then negative excess demand must exist for other goods to balance it out due to
budget constraints.
Equilibrium in the economy exists at a price p for which there exists d ∈ D(p)
such that dj ≤ sj for all j = 1, 2, ..., n. At this price, the overall demand for
each good is not more than the supply of that good in the economy and so the
demand can be met. Thus, there will be no tendency for the price to change
within the market and the economy would be at rest. This price p is called an
equilibrium price vector for the economy. We use the Kakutani fixed point
theorem to show the existence of a price equilibrium vector for an economy such
as the one described above.
Theorem 4.3. Assume we have a pure exchange economy with n goods and m
consumers. Further assume we have p, Di(p) and s = (s1, ..., sn) as defined above.
In particular, assume Di(p) is set-valued and continuous and such that Di(p) is
convex. Then there exists an equilibrium price vector for the economy.
We prove Theorem 4.3 through a series of results below. To begin, for each
e ∈ E(p), let f(e, p) ∈ Rn define a price tendency vector whose jth
component is
fj(e, p) =
max {pj + ej, 0}
n∑
j=1
max {pj + ej, 0}
. (4.21)
Thus, fj(e, p) represents the tendency of the price of good j to change if there
is excess demand for the good in the economy at price p. It reflects the idea that
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if there is excess demand for a good, then the relative price of it increases. Note
that fj(e, p) is only a tool we use in the proof of Theorem 4.3 and is not
necessarily of direct importance in the economy.
We need to check that f(e, p) is defined. In other words, we need to show that
n∑
j=1
max {pj + ej, 0} 6= 0.
Lemma 4.1. For each e ∈ E(p), there exists j such that pj + ej > 0.
Proof. By Equation 4.20,
(p + e) · p = p · p > 0.
Since the dot product (p + e) · p is positive, and pj ≥ 0 for all j, there exists
j such that pj + ej > 0.
By Lemma 4.1, for a given p, f(e, p) is defined for all e ∈ E(p) since the
denominator is non-zero. By definition of f(e, p), it follows that f(e, p) ∈ S.
Then, for a price p, the set of all the price adjustment vectors, F (p), is given by
F (p) = { f(e, p) | e ∈ E(p) } ⊂ S. (4.22)
Therefore F : S → P (S) defines a set valued function. Since E(p) is convex
in Rn, it is not difficult to see that F (p) is a convex set in S for each p. Also, it
is not difficult to show that F is continuous since each mapping p to Di(p) is
continuous.
Thus, the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem are satisfied, and it
follows that there exists a fixed point p∗ ∈ S. By definition of fixed point,
p∗ ∈ F (p∗).
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In other words,
p∗ = f(e∗, p∗) for some e∗ ∈ E(p∗). (4.23)
Then by Equation 4.21, for all j = 1, 2, ..., n,
p∗j =
max {p∗j + e∗j , 0}
n∑
j=1
max {p∗j + e∗j , 0}
. (4.24)
We want to show that p∗ is an equilibrium price vector. In order to prove that,
we will begin by stating and proving a simple lemma that will help us.
Lemma 4.2.
n∑
j=1
max {p∗j + e∗j , 0} = 1.
Proof. Let k =
n∑
j=1
max {p∗j + ej, 0}. We claim that for all j,
p∗j e
∗
j = (k − 1) p∗j p∗j .
Clearly, this equation is true if p∗j = 0. Consider the case p∗j > 0. Then by
Equation 4.24,
max {p∗j + e∗j , 0}
k
= p∗j > 0.
It follows that p∗j + e∗j > 0 and k p∗j = p∗j + e∗j .
Hence e∗j = (k − 1) p∗j , and therefore p∗j e∗j = (k − 1) p∗j p∗j . Since this holds
for all j, we conclude that
p∗ · e∗ = (k − 1) p∗ · p∗.
However, p∗ · p∗ > 0 and by Equation 4.20, p∗ · e∗ = 0. Therefore,
k − 1 = 0 and hence, k = 1.
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Lemma 4.2 will help us in our objective of showing that p∗ is an equilibrium
price vector.
Theorem 4.4. p∗ is an equilibrium price vector.
Proof. Since p∗ is a fixed point of F, p∗ = f(e∗, p∗) for e∗ = d∗ − s in E(p∗)
where d∗ ∈ D(p∗). Hence,
d∗ = e∗ + s. (4.25)
We want to show that d∗j ≤ sj for all j = 1, 2, ...,m, and therefore p∗ is an
equilibrium price vector.
By Lemma 4.1,
n∑
j=1
max {p∗j + e∗j , 0} = 1. Then by Equation 4.24, for all
j = 1, 2, ..., n,
p∗j = max {p∗j + e∗j , 0}. (4.26)
For each j, we have two possibilities:
1. p∗j = 0 :
Then, in Equation 4.26, max {p∗j + e∗j , 0} = 0. Therefore, e∗j ≤ 0.
By Equation 4.25, d∗j = e∗j + sj, and hence d∗j ≤ sj
2. p∗j > 0 :
Then, in Equation 4.26, p∗j = p∗j + e∗j . Therefore, e∗j = 0.
By Equation 4.25, d∗j = e∗j + sj, and hence d∗j = sj.
Thus, d∗j ≤ sj for all j = 1, 2, ..., n. Hence, the fixed point p∗ of the function
F is an equilibrium price vector.
Via the results above, we have now proven Theorem 4.3.
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Thus, the Kakutani fixed point theorem allows us to establish the existence of a
price equilibrium in a pure exchange economy. Since the price equilibrium
vector is a fixed point of the function F (p) as defined above, it is possible to
have an equilibrium price vector where the economy is at rest and there is a
demand vector at that price that is met by the supply.
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